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Who Qualifies for 
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A Systems Perspective on Human and 
Other Possibly Intelligent Beings Taking 
Part in the Next Society*
by Dirk Baecker, Zeppelin University, 
Friedrichshafen
Next society might be that in which computer-
based artificial intelligences begin to take part 
in communication. We therefore need to re-
think one of modern society’s most cherished 
ideas: that only humans qualify for communi-
cation. We have driven spirits, gods, and de-
vils, animals, and plants out of this realm. This 
paper looks into notions of society, communi-
cation, and the social propounded by the the-
ory of social systems to investigate how and 
when artificial intelligences will be able to join 
human beings in that most demanding under-
taking, communication. Independence, self-
reference, and complexity are identified as 
some of the conditions artificial intelligences 
will have to fulfill. It will take new structures 
and a new culture for society to live up to this.
I
Next society’s most distinctive characteristics 
will be to abandon modern society’s idea that 
only human beings qualify for communication 
and to extend this peculiar activity to computers. 
This at least is Niklas Luhmann’s hypothesis. 
He maintains that the closure of communication 
allowing for structural couplings with human 
beings’ consciousness and nothing else will ad-
mit another case of structural coupling as compu-
ters come of age and learn how to participate in 
communication (Luhmann 1997, pp. 117–118). 
We will hence have to rethink what we under-
stand by “social” and who can engage in social 
activities. We will make the case not for adding 
ideas on the parasocial to our rather unclear un-
derstanding of the social or even calling an end 
to it but rather for sharpening and perhaps radica-
lizing our conception of the social to re-integrate 
intelligent beings other than humans.
Luhmann’s hypothesis is non-self-evident in 
several aspects. All the notions it employs need 
explanation. Indeed, the very hypothesis of a next 
society emerging is a challenge to sociology to re-
consider both its phenomenological stance and its 
theoretical and methodological apparatus (Baeck-
er 2007; Baecker 2007/2008). Thus, the notions 
of society, communication, human beings, con-
sciousness, and computers all need clarification, 
and the notions of system, closure, and structural 
coupling, among others, seek to pose new kinds of 
questions and develop new kinds of descriptions.
Note, however, that the idea that only con-
sciousness has access to communication and that 
therefore only human beings are engaged in so-
ciety is a restrictive idea entertained only by mo-
dern society, which has driven ghosts and devils, 
spirits and gods, plants and animals out of the 
realm where partners in communication were to 
be found. This is the flop side of humanism’s ve-
nerable attempt to liberate humans from natural 
and mystical confinement. The world of human 
beings has been emptied of any other kind of in-
telligence for listening to and talking with. Only 
the ecological movement has made any move to 
change this, at least taking note both of the hub-
ris of human beings and of their loneliness in a 
world bereft of any other kinds of intelligence 
(Latour 1993; Latour 2004).
The advent of computers, computer net-
works, artificial intelligence, robots, software 
agents, and avatars presents the ecological mo-
vement with unlikely allies in its attempt to put 
the idea that only human beings qualify for com-
munication at least in parentheses. All categories 
privileging human beings for both consciousness 
and communication are in some sense called into 
question. At the same time, unique features of hu-
man beings such as their bodies and senses, which 
constitute their “wetware” and distinguish them 
for the time being from artificial intelligences, are 
being rediscovered. Ironically these are the very 
features held in poor esteem by the same modern 
philosophy that thought human beings singular. 
Humans have lost reflexivity as their most di-
stinctive feature and have in some strange kind 
of deal regained their body only to find it being 
scrutinized for virtuality, as well (Hayles 1999).
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II
There are hence several questions we need to look 
at more closely. The first is the alleged shift from 
modern to next society, followed by the notions of 
society, communication, and the social that need 
clarification to establish who could qualify to par-
ticipate. Last not least we will have to look at both 
human beings and computers so that we can com-
pare them with regard to the potential for commu-
nication. We will skip questions of consciousness 
as they do not fall within the area of sociological 
competence. Moreover, consciousness may pro-
ve to be a function rather than an entity (James 
1922), so that a better understanding of both com-
munication and organism is required if we are to 
gain any insight into what we need consciousness 
for. Considered in terms of the cognitive sciences, 
consciousness may turn out to be a kind of delay 
function ensuring that bodily perception and soci-
al intercourse are not confused at the moment of 
linking or structurally coupling (Frith 2007).
Before looking at the notion of society, 
however, we have to introduce that of “next so-
ciety” coined by Peter F. Drucker (2001, 2003). 
As Marshall McLuhan, Manuel Castells, Niklas 
Luhmann, and others agree, next society means 
that the introduction of the computer based on 
the invention of electricity is changing society 
as much as the introduction of the printing press 
based on movable letters and thus mechanics did 
in producing modern society. Quite some know-
ledge collected in the last century by the huma-
nities is converging with surprising coherence 
toward the assumption that a few media for the 
dissemination of communication in human his-
tory have dominated in challenging what struc-
tures and cultures emerge in society. Four media 
epochs in society stand out: tribal society, cataly-
zed by oral language; ancient society, by written 
language; modern society, by the printing press; 
and next society, by electricity and the computer.
This is not say that other things become less 
important, to mention only the potato, the plow, 
gunpowder, paper, the wheel (both in ships as land 
vehicles), bureaucracy, women’s emancipation, 
television, and so forth. But these inventions can 
been seen as secondary in the sense that they were 
enabled or demanded by more important inven-
tions in the dissemination media of communica-
tion (McLuhan 1967; Castells 1996). Moreover, 
the overwhelming importance of these media lies 
not only in liberating new kinds of far-reaching 
communication but in the challenges these new 
kinds of communication posed for the societal 
structure and culture. Where the structure and cul-
ture of a society are, for instance, adapted to oral 
communication, the invention of written commu-
nication comes as a surplus nobody is prepared for 
or knows how to deal with. Society has to develop 
modes for rejecting communications that come 
with these new media in order to adapt to it slow-
ly and accept it selectively. This happened with 
the introduction of language, writing, the printing 
press, and the computer. In each case structures 
had to be developed to ensure the dissemination 
of communication, such as tribes, social strata, 
functional subsystems, and networks, depending 
on a culture form that also had to be developed to 
enable society to reduce the overflow of meaning 
to devices to control it, such as boundaries for tri-
bal society, telos for ancient society, equilibrium 
for modern society, and, possibly, system for next 
society (Luhmann 1997, pp. 410–412).
We do not have to go into the details of the 
theory of the dependence of societal structure and 
culture forms on dominant communication disse-
mination media (Baecker 2007). We need it just to 
mark the threshold from modern society to next 
society. Modern society emerged when the prin-
ting press and whole populations beginning to 
read and to write produced an overflow of unpre-
cedented comparison and criticism. This overflow 
was tackled by the Renaissance, humanism and 
the French Revolution, and was then channeled 
into the functional subsystems of society, such 
as democratized politics, the market economy, 
positive law, empirical science, intimate religion, 
passionate love, and autonomous art, all of which 
transformed communication from self-evident 
convention and tradition into restless second-
order observation (Luhmann 1998). Yet, it order 
to encourage reading and criticism while dealing 
with this criticism in interaction, it proved helpful 
first to individualize human beings and then sub-
ject them to ideas of human reason, which, if they 
were to be effective, demanded exclusivity with 
respect to gods and animals. Ever since, moder-
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nity has focused on the restless equilibria of in-
dividuals, markets, publics, scientific truths, love 
affairs, beautiful art, and so on, bound up with the 
conviction that reason, if not progress, is immi-
nent. Talcott Parsons accordingly conjectures that 
in modernity the principle of the structural stabi-
lity of social strata is replaced by that of media of 
interchange or communication (Parsons 1977).
All this means that we have to look closely 
at how society presents us with what kind of over-
flow of meaning produced by what kind of dis-
semination medium in order to understand what 
structure and culture are emerging both to ensure 
the overflow and reduce it to forms in which it 
can be handled. The notion of “form” as proposed 
by Georg Spencer-Brown (1972) is useful in this 
context since it combines indication of a selective 
operation with distinction from everything else, 
so that the re-entry of this distinction into the dis-
tinction ties selection into an understanding of its 
selectivity. We will be coming back to this.
The notion of next society is meant to empha-
size that with the advent of electricity and com-
puters, language, writing, and the printing press as 
the older media for disseminating communication 
are being transformed by a new dissemination me-
dium that poses a new problem of overflow and 
thus demands new kinds of structure and culture 
of society. It can be posited that the overflow of 
reference to the absent was the problem posed 
by language and that boundaries restricting who 
talks to whom, when and on what subject were 
the answer that allowed tribal society to emerge; 
that the overflow of symbols extending far into the 
past and future was the problem posed by writing, 
and that teloi distinguishing the perfect from the 
corrupt were the answer that permitted ancient so-
ciety to emerge; that the overflow of criticism of 
anything and anybody by anybody was the prob-
lem posed by the printing press, and that restless 
equilibria framed by reason or rationality provided 
the answer leading to the emergence of modern 
society. Then the overflow of control can be seen 
as the problem posed by computers and notions of 
system the possible answer that allows the emer-
gence of next society. However, the leading hypo-
thesis, like that of dissemination media producing 
overflows of meaning obliging a society to deve-
lop a culture form to handle it, is as non-trivial as 
the corresponding notions of society, media, dis-
semination, overflow, structure, culture, and form. 
For thirty years, Niklas Luhmann prepared a book 
of some thousand pages to provide a description 
of the structure and the culture of modern society 
that would help us to know where to look, what 
to describe, and what notions to use in understan-
ding society’s transformation into next society, a 
transformation he cautiously hinted at but did not 
elaborate on (Luhmann 1997; Baecker 2006).
To be sure, all older media of dissemination, 
not to mention media of success such as money, 
power, truth, love, or art, are here to stay, all in 
transformed guise and a changing social context. 
We still talk, write, and print, and we are still bound 
up with the culture forms that came with these me-
dia, such as the respect for boundaries, the longing 
for purpose (or telos), and of course the hope of 
reason and rationality. But it would be sentimental 
to believe these culture forms are able to deal with 
the overflow of meaning produced by computers 
and their networks and by the artificial intelligence 
possibly developing within this new medium for 
disseminating communication. Let us rather con-
sider what notions of society, communication, and 
control prepare us to watch what will be happening 
with computers and with us in next society.
III
Unfortunately, sociology is as much a child of 
modern society with its insistence on individuality 
and reason as it is a child of industrial society with 
its experience of social inequality, urban society, 
and individual alienation. The ambivalent stance 
resulting from this double and antithetic childhood 
shows in many respects, in empirical research that 
looks into social problems while nevertheless see-
king to be useful, as in a notional apparatus that, 
for instance, emphasizes the possibility and in-
tentionality of action while at the same time sus-
pecting “norms”, “roles”, “structures”, “systems”, 
or “networks” takeoff taking the lead in social 
dynamics. Rare are ideas in sociological theory 
that deal head-on with the ensuing paradoxes and 
focus on notions accepting that the emergence of 
society informs rather than results from individual 
action (Tarde 1969; Latour 2005; Luhmann 1995).
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This is why the notion of communication 
never really took hold in sociology, despite the 
forceful case made by Michel Serres, Jürgen 
Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, each with his 
distinctive focus: Serres on the creativity of dis-
turbance, Habermas on the possibility of reasoned 
consensus, and Luhmann on structures that ren-
der improbable communication probable (Serres 
1982; Habermas 1984; Luhmann 1995). Those 
foci are not really such worlds apart as often be-
lieved. All, or so it seems, accept the non-triviality 
and the non-linearity of communication, so that all 
deal with surprise or with correlation not confined 
to causality. It would not be too difficult to imagine 
a parasite developing subtle kinds of reason to in-
vest imponderable communication with structure 
enabling combination of the three approaches. But 
we will not be going into a sociological or socio-
philosophical discussion (see, for instance, Rasch 
2000), but concentrating on the notion of commu-
nication itself, informed, as it were, by our need 
to come up with an understanding of the concept 
commensurate with our understanding of society.
There are three features of any useful notion 
of communication we need to keep in mind when 
testing the qualifications of new intelligent be-
ings for participating through communication in 
a society that thus transforms itself from modern 
to next society. They are selectivity, recursivity, 
and closure.
“Selectivity” is Claude E. Shannon’s con-
tribution to communication theory. Somewhat 
hidden by the famous but seriously misleading 
channel model of communication presented in 
Shannon and Weaver’s book, the truly seminal 
contribution of Shannon’s statistical notion of 
communication is to propose a notion of informa-
tion emphasizing that information is the relation 
of a selected message to the set of possible mes-
sages from which the selection is taken (Shannon, 
Weaver 1963, p. 31). This means that one has to 
know about both the set of possible messages and 
the selection taken from it to know about the fact 
and the content of the information of a message. 
Shannon underestimated the range of his statis-
tical idea in considering it an engineer’s notion 
(ibid., p. 31). As I have shown elsewhere, we 
have to abandon the engineering idea that the set 
of possible messages is technically given for the 
alternative view that this set is to be socially con-
structed along with any message in order not only 
to bring semantics back in into communication 
theory but also to establish its inherent place in 
the theory as the more general case of any com-
munication (Baecker 1997, 2005).
To focus on the relation between one selec-
tion of a message and the set of possible, probable, 
or expected messages, i.e. to focus on the selec-
tivity of any message as its information content is 
an idea George Spencer-Brown has made easier 
to grasp in his notion of “form”, which makes the 
same point (Spencer-Brown 1972). As I see it, 
Shannon’s definition of information, if general-
ized with respect to both exogenously given or 
endogenously constructed sets of messages, may 
some day be considered one of the most important 
ideas of the second half of the twentieth century, 
introducing the necessity to define units by differ-
ence, or units by complements that has proved so 
important for structuralist, post-structuralist, de-
constructive, systemic, and constructivist think-
ing (Descombes 1980; Luhmann 2002).
Anyway, if selectivity and not transfer is 
the focus of mathematical systems theory, then 
our first answer to the question of who qualifies 
for communication is just about anybody and 
anything able to make this kind of selection, i.e. 
comparing a message in this fashion with a set 
of possible, probable, or expected messages. Any 
entity whatsoever that can do statistics and recal-
culate its expectations in the light of experience 
qualifies for communication.
Note that in the following pages we will not 
be talking about “entities”, as would be the more 
expected phrasing, but about “units”, much as 
this suggests the membership of a larger whole. 
Wording here is bound by cultural prejudice. We 
are using the term “unit” to avoid the implication 
of self-containment coming with “entity” and to 
allude to an understanding of the whole, which is 
prominent in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, the 
“whole” here not suggesting that indeed there is 
a cosmological closure of the world but instead 
reminding one of the necessary “Erg�nzungs-
bedürftigkeit” of any one unit, a necessity to be 
supplemented by something it can not contain it-
self (Heidegger 1995).
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IV
Of course, this is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition. A second condition is also necessary: 
recursivity between communicative events, i.e. 
messages, with the precondition of recursivity 
between units participating in communication. It 
is difficult to separate this second condition from 
the third, closure (or, indeed, from the first one, 
selectivity), but it nevertheless helps clarify our 
concept of communication if we look at recursi-
vity and closure separately to begin with.
Recursivity means three things. First, that 
any message is to be considered a message only 
if there are further messages, preceding and sub-
sequent. Indeed, without further messages there 
would be no set of possible messages, which is 
crucial for the concept of selectivity. A message is 
to be specified only in relation to other messages, 
which means that communication is primarily de-
termined by itself and not by the world it brings 
news from. This self-determination (or “closure”, 
see below) ensures that communication needs not 
one but several elements, or better, events, if it is 
to take place, and the recursivity between these 
events is to be used to find out what the communi-
cation is about. Communication is a multi-event 
event. It needs distributed intelligence.
The second thing recursivity is about con-
cerns distribution as well, or “multiple constitu-
tion”, as Luhmann calls it (1995, pp. 38–39). Se-
veral units have to be involved in communication 
in such a way that any participating unit realizes 
that the occurrence, continuation, and understan-
ding of communication depend not on one but on 
multiple units, at least on a specified or unspe-
cified other or you to be addressed. This is why 
Heinz von Foerster postulates the “hermeneutic 
principle” that the listener, not the speaker deter-
mines what is being said (von Foerster, Poerksen 
2002). And this is why, in their first comprehen-
sive attempt to bring Shannon’s notion of com-
munication to both psychiatry and cultural theory, 
Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson invented the 
indicator of error correction to provide an empiri-
cal clue as to whether communication is going on 
or not (Ruesch, Bateson 1951). Since communica-
tion is not to be confused with causality (which is 
certainly also difficult to address empirically), we 
need evidence that it is indeed happening; and this 
evidence may be that there are several units con-
tributing to it, which, when committing errors, are 
addressed with respect to these errors and are able 
to correct them precisely because they have been 
so addressed. Error correction would be evidence 
of mutual awareness, and mutual awareness is the 
precondition for a unit to perceive itself as partici-
pating in communication. Even more importantly, 
error correction would be evidence for feedback, 
positive or negative, and thus, again, for recursive 
closure.And the last but not least important thing 
that recursivity is about is self-affection, a noti-
on introduced by George Herbert Mead (1934) 
meaning that any unit participating in communi-
cation can do so only if it proves to be affected 
by communication and thereby participating in 
communication. The first listener, even if not the 
most perceptive, is the speaker himself. It should 
be noted that the self of the affection involved ma-
kes a distinction between the self speaking and 
the self listening, so that the unit participating in 
communication is to be determined as much by 
what it experiences in communication as by how 
it intentionally tries to influence communication.
Thus, recursivity involves messages re-
ferring to messages, units mutually perceiving 
themselves, and any unit also affecting itself 
when taking part in communication.
V
If we add the third concept, closure, which is in 
fact implicit in both selectivity and recursivity, we 
end up with an operational concept of communi-
cation able to check what it means to communica-
te and who qualifies to join in. Closure means that 
only communication qualifies to reproduce com-
munication (Luhmann 1992); no human beings, 
no gods, no animals, no devils do. This, again, is 
a feature that distinguishes systems theory from 
network theory. In network theory, at least in its 
sociological versions, the most heterogeneous 
elements are welcome, people as much as orga-
nizations, stories as much as practices, tools as 
much as sites, as long as they constitute units that 
gain their identity from attempts to control and be 
controlled by units in the same network (White 
1992), or which figure as references in the same 
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controversies (Latour 2005). Networks do not 
have boundaries, systems do. That is why “net-
work” is a structural notion, whereas “system” is 
an operational notion (Baecker 2009). Systems 
produce and reproduce themselves by one and 
the same type of operation, which in the case of 
social systems and in Niklas Luhmann’s version 
are communications taking shape as events. They 
combine, for just a moment, utterance, informati-
on, and understanding, and disintegrate in almost 
the very same moment (Luhmann 1992; Luhmann 
1995). This is how and why they literally produce 
the necessity to find continuation through further 
events connecting to them; if they fail to do so the 
social system comes to an end.
Closure, of course, means that conscious-
ness, intention, purpose, and action fall within the 
environment of the system. They may be and con-
tinually are referred to at the behest of the system, 
but they do not compose the system nor do they 
constrain the system more than by necessarily 
being referred to. Thus, if there is no conscious-
ness available to be addressed by a social system, 
the system falters. Equally, if there are no actions 
to which the system can refer in describing who is 
doing or planning or remembering what, the sys-
tem once again falters. And last not least, if there 
are no intentions and no purpose to be addressed 
and to be changed by the system, the system loses 
its ability to steer itself, i.e. to gain a structure that 
helps it find next elements.
Note that we are again talking about the pre-
mises of a theory, about assumptions leading the 
search for evidence, which is then used to design 
a description of what is going on. One cannot see 
nor prove closure any more than one can see or 
prove a system, or a communication, or the au-
topoiesis of a system. All these are assumptions 
that are either useful in the search for evidence 
and its weaving into a description or not.
In our regard, closure means that we are free 
from humanist bias in searching for possible com-
munication. Instead, we can inquire into the qua-
lities of human beings that seem to qualify them 
so indisputably and without parallel for commu-
nication. Indeed, the very search for other possib-
le candidates for participation in communication 
means distancing oneself from assumptions that 
human beings are in some sense of a rational or 
otherwise unique nature, possessing, for examp-
le, not only brains but also a consciousness, that 
entails an inability to avoid communication with 
each other – whether the desire to talk assumed 
by Aristotle or the wish to engage in exchange 
posited by Adam Smith. If we do not accept such 
anthropological thinking we have to look more 
closely at the possible reasons why human beings 
qualify for communication. And if these reasons 
apply to other entities as well, then we are dealing 
with a concept of communication that may lend 
itself to other intelligent beings, as well.
There are three such reasons applicable only 
to human beings since the exclusion of spirits, 
gods, devils, plants, and animals, namely inde-
pendence, self-reference, and complexity. All 
three reasons may well prove to be one, but again 
it helps to spell them out separately.
“Independence” means that any human ta-
king part in communication does so as an inde-
pendent organism with a more or less indepen-
dent consciousness having its own memories and 
expectations. This independence means that at 
any instant the human being taking part in com-
munication may feel free to turn away and leave. 
No communication however powerful can change 
this. Indeed, all communication tries to reconfi-
gure independence to establish secure expecta-
tions. But if this reconfiguration is to succeed, 
communication must presuppose the continuing 
independence of the organisms participating. The 
only exception is the exercise of violence, which, 
however, as long as it is no more than the exercise 
of violence, ends communication.
The closure of communication, i.e. the con-
dition that communication alone and no thought, 
no perception, no action, no desire can prompt 
communication, is tantamount to assuring the 
independence of the participating entities. None 
of these entities can itself become an element of 
communication; it needs to find a way to indu-
ce communication, which then needs a reason of 
its own to continue, and has no way of ensuring 
that the entity that induced it will stay the course. 
Without going into sociological details, we can 
say that all social systems can work only by en-
couraging human beings that might participate to 
give up the independence they gain. The terms 
of trade between giving up and gaining indepen-
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dence vary widely, and neither equilibrium bet-
ween these terms nor voluntariness are required; 
but if not even a minimum of independence pre-
vails we do not dealing with communication.
It would be hard to tell whether indepen-
dence is in play if humans or other kinds of in-
telligent being did not practice “self-reference”. 
Any closure of communication involves units 
that are able to refer both to communication and 
to themselves. Without the distinction between 
other-reference and self-reference no decisions 
would be taken or attributed on how and when 
and why such a unit may participate. It is inte-
resting in itself that human beings need not only 
consciousness but even more so a body they can 
refer to if they are to know where they begin and 
where they end (Merleau-Ponty 1963). The same 
condition holds in communication. As any “theory 
of mind” maintains (Byrne, Whiten 1988; Whiten 
1991; Whiten, Byrne 1997), mutual awareness 
demands both mutual awareness of the other and 
awareness of oneself being aware of oneself. This 
leads to intriguing knots of interminglement, the 
price to be paid for taking part in communication 
without being absorbed by communication, never 
mind how fascinating for both body and mind the-
se kinds of knots may turn out to be (Laing 1970).
“Complexity” therefore comes naturally. 
Depending on the given notion of complexity, 
both communication and the units taking part in 
it are either multi-elements, multi-relations, con-
tinually changing multi-elements and multi-rela-
tions systems or they are units that, as distinc-
tions, combine a system side and an environment 
side that are both complementary and cannot be 
reduced to each other (Morin 1974). Complexity 
means that no understanding but only control is 
possible, a control, moreover, that cannot refer 
to the complex other, but to oneself and to one’s 
own part in interaction with the other (Ashby 
1958). Control is another word for the buildup 
and use of a memory. Complexity is a feature of 
this memory of interaction, which, however, may 
prove identical with what we take to be a system, 
be it social, mental, or artificial.
Thus, the closure of communication, even 
disregarding sociological descriptions of its 
structure and culture ensuing from this closure, 
show independent, self-referential, and complex 
units taking part in communication, a highly li-
beral image of intransparent individuals liberated 
to take part in communication at will developed 
by modern society in distinction to a more tra-
ditional notion of individuals belonging to social 
strata that order and structure society. In modern 
society it is the choice of the individual that lends 
structure and order to society. Yet both “individu-
al” and “subject” are wild cards to be defined by 
various social systems (Luhmann 1989; Lehmann 
in print). They do not have to be humanistically or 
anthropologically fixed to be assigned to human 
beings and human beings alone. Just about any 
unit able to manifest these properties qualifies for 
communication. I gladly leave it to the experts in 
theology, ethology, artificial intelligence, and ar-
tificial life to come up with promising candidates 
among spirits and devils, animals, and machines.
VI
In conclusion, we emphasize that our scrutiny of 
selectivity, recursivity, and closure seeks to clear 
the ground for reformulating a notion of commu-
nication that is not bound to either humanist or 
modern prejudices but examines what makes a 
relationship social.
In other words, our inquiries seek neither 
to open up the notion of communication for so-
called parasocial relationships nor to call an end 
to the social because its modern preconditions 
no longer hold. Parasocial relationships assume 
selectivity, recursivity, and independence at only 
one end of a communication channel whose other 
end is occupied by a spectacle to be watched or a 
machine to be used that is denied all freedom of 
behavior (Horton, Wohl 1956). Our concern can-
not be such an understanding of parasocial rela-
tions since we focus on the communicative event 
itself, not on the participants, examining its ei-
gen-dynamics, which have no need of “real” per-
sons or the “presence” of both actors to develop 
and thrive in the hands of self-recruited editors, 
programmers, audiences, and users. And the end 
of “the social” assumes, not without historical 
plausibility, that the career of the notion requires 
us to assume that social relations link human be-
ings, and only human beings – and that, together 
with ‘reason’, social relations not only connect 
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humans but distinguish them as such (Baudrillard 
2007; Latour 2001). We cannot go along with this 
historical reassessment either, because we find it 
much more interesting to follow how the social 
comes to be understood as constituted by rela-
tions of dependency between independent indi-
viduals and the generalization of this understand-
ing to include complex entities other than human.
Our concern is not the parasocial or the end 
of the social or any, as it were, quasi-intelligences 
but the possible transformation of modern into 
next society, prompted by computers, the “invis-
ible machines” (Luhmann 1997, pp. 304–305) 
equipped with their own memory and linked into 
complex networks as only human beings had 
been, and which are moreover fast and able to rely 
on rich algorithms and to handle vastly greater 
amounts of memory than any human. Back in the 
1990s, Niklas Luhmann pointed out that we need 
not worry about computers even if they develop 
consciousness unless they prove capable of taking 
part in communication. This, however, they are 
unlikely to achieve because to do so they would 
have to be capable of dealing with knowledge 
and ignorance alike, which remains unlikely, but 
is necessary in communication (Luhmann 1997, 
p 303). Because why would anybody engage in 
communication if it were not for ignorance to be 
remedied, or, sometimes, ignorance on the other’s 
side to be maintained (Sacks 1992)? Indeed, a so-
ciety featuring more intelligent beings than we 
are hitherto used to would not change as much 
as a society which would have to deal with those 
intelligent beings engaging with communica-
tion in not only faster and more connective ways 
but perhaps also in ways relying on algorithms 
we humans have no chance to detect let alone to 
understand. Again, we do not have to understand 
communication or the units taking part in it in or-
der to nevertheless being able to go along with it; 
control, as we know (Ashby 1958), is sufficient. 
But we may have to deal with ways of control 
mastered by computers that are superior to ours.
The time of computers being engaged in 
communication probably has not yet come. Yet, 
more recent investigations of so-called embed-
ded systems go a long way toward understanding 
some demands on interaction, such as robustness, 
and on the necessary complexity, or heterogene-
ity, of participating entities (Henziger, Sifakis 
2007; Lee 2008). John von Neumann’s idea of 
the “synthesis of reliable organisms from unreli-
able components” is also being taking more and 
more seriously, the idea that features can emerge 
in a system on the system level that no element 
contributes (von Neumann 1956), and Claude E. 
Shannon’s idea that “the system must be designed 
to operate for each possible selection, not just the 
one which will be chosen since this is unknown at 
the time of the design” (Shannon, Weaver 1963, 
p. 31). Should it prove possible to artificially 
implement mutual error correction with relative 
ease, the next step could be to enable artificial 
intelligences to deal with ignorance, thus follow-
ing Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores’ idea of 
making “breakdown survival” the most telling 
proof of intelligence (Winograd, Flores 1986).
We therefore propose to align certain en-
gineering ideas on artificial systems and certain 
sociological ideas on social systems through a 
Spencer-Brown equation in the interests of sys-
tems research appropriate for the demands of next 
society (Baecker 2005, pp. 63–64):
Any entity able to read constraints into degrees 
of freedom without necessarily feeling obliged to 
attribute a degree of freedom or constraint to it-
self, to the other, or to the situation, but which al-
lows both features, negating and implying them-
selves, to float freely in exploring and exploiting 
a situation qualifies for communication.
Any assessment of the consequences of intro-
ducing new technologies, Technikfolgenabschät-
zung, must accordingly, as it certainly already 
does, integrate sociological theory of society. In-
troducing not only electricity and computers but 
also artificial intelligent beings into communica-
tion means that both the structure and culture of 
society will have to change. We will need struc-
tures that allow for these beings to develop their 
own intransparency on the basis of independence, 
self-reference, and complexity. And we will need 
a culture that describes and conventionalizes the 
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reasons to either reject or accept communications 
we (and others) attribute to computers. The alter-
native to developing such structures and culture 
would be, or so it seems, another Luddism, which 
should and will be a societal option.
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Die Natürlichkeit künstlicher 
Intelligenzen und Umwelten
von Hajo Greif, Arno Bammé, Wilhelm Berger 
und Matthias Werner, Alpen-Adria-Universität
Der Beitrag versucht eine dritte Perspektive 
jenseits zweier aktueller Debatten zu gewin-
nen: der Debatte um künstliche Intelligenz 
und der Debatte um Ambient Intelligence. Zwei 
Fallbeispiele aus diesen Bereichen werden 
diskutiert: „augmented reality“ und „embodied 
conversational agents“ (Konversationsagen-
ten). Dabei zeigt es sich, dass Fragen nach der 
faktischen Möglichkeit von künstlicher Intelli-
genz auf eine pragmatische Ebene herunter-
gebogen werden sollten. Was natürlich oder 
künstlich ist, kann nicht a priori beantwortet 
werden, sondern muss jeweils empirisch, d. h. 
anhand der konkreten sozialen Handlungen 
und Interaktionen und ihrer Bewertung durch 
diejenigen, die in sie eingebunden sind, disku-
tiert werden. Dabei ergeben sich interessante 
Fragestellungen: Wie finden die Interessen 
verschiedener Akteure Eingang in künstliche 
Organisation sozialer Handlungen? In welcher 
Weise erscheinen von künstlichen Akteuren 
bewohnte künstliche Umwelten ihren Bewoh-
nerInnen letztlich als natürlich?
1 Zwei komplementäre Ansätze
Der Großteil der philosophischen und sozialwis-
senschaftlichen Debatten um das Konzept und die 
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die Frage ausgerichtet, inwieweit digitale Compu-
ter menschliche Denkprozesse und eventuell auch 
Handlungsweisen nachahmen können (Turing 
1950). W�hrend zun�chst die Frage im Mittelpunkt 
stand, ob auf dem Wege formal-symbolischer Mo-
delle ein hinreichendes Maß an Menschen�hnlich-
keit auf den Ebenen von Struktur und Verhalten 
erzielt werden kann1, stützt sich ein Großteil der 
neueren kritischen Einwendungen gegen die KI 
auf das Argument, dass menschliche Intelligenz 
essentiell von den vielf�ltigen, komplexen und, so 
heißt es, nicht formalisierbaren Beziehungen zwi-
schen Mensch und Umwelt abh�ngig sei.2 Diese 
Beziehungen seien von der KI-Forschung lange 
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